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CURRENT DECISIONS
Torts-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF INCOMPETENTS-PROBLEM
AREA OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY LESS THAN TOTAL. In Wright v. Tate,"
decedent, a 22 year-old guest passenger of low intelligence, was killed
in an accident while riding with defendant-operator whose driving
ability had been seriously impaired by overindulgence in alcoholic
beverages. A wrongful death action was brought in which the decedent
was held as a matter of law2 to have been contributorily negligent and
thereby assumed the risk of injury, inasmuch as he continued to ride
knowing well of defendant's conspicuous intoxicated condition.
Facing for the first time the question of whether or not a person
with a mental deficiency less than total, i.e., of low mentality but not
insane, is to be charged with the same degree of care for his own
safety as a reasonable man of ordinary prudence, the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, "[ilf the rule were otherwise,
there would be a different standard for each level of intelligence re-
sulting in confusion and uncertainty in the law." 3
It has been generally recognized that, "... . a subjective standard will
be applied in determining the contributory negligence of insane plain-
tiffs." 4 While there exists a scarcity of cases directly in point, the
accepted rule in the United States today is that an individual com-
pletely lacking in the ability to apprehend and avoid danger because
resort to a § 9(c) election, the machinery for the resolution of representa-
tion questions.
1. 208 Va. 291, 156 S.E.2d 562 (1967).
2. Whether a guest knew or should have known that the intoxicated condition of
the driver impaired his ability to drive is ordinarily a question for the jury. Meade,
Adm'r v. Meade, Adm'r, 206 Va. 823, 827, 147 S.E. 2d 171, 174 (1966). But here there
was no conflict in the evidence that the ability of the driver was so impaired.
3. 208 Va. 291, 156 S.E.2d 562 (1967) at 565. Prosser on primary negligence states:
"As to all lack of intelligence short of actual insanity no allowance is made; the standard
of reasonable conduct is applied . . . ." Paossr , ToaRTs 156 (1964). ". . . [M]on-
tributory negligence is, in general, determined by much the same tests and rules as
the negligence of the defendant." Id. at 429; but Prosser points up a split of authority
among the few cases litigated. Id. at 156 n. 37.
4. 2 HARPER & JAMEs, ToRTs § 16.8 (1956). An objective test was followed in Criez
v. Sunset Motor Co., 123 Wash. 604, 213 P. 7 (1923), which involved a mentally-ill
auto driver. Pursuant to the strict mandate of a motor vehicle law, the Washington
court held that all drivers must exercise reasonable care in the operation of vehicles
for the safety of all highway users, but carefully limited its holding relevant to this
specific statute, as could well be the case where any such legislation has been made
so applicable. See also Deisenreifer v. Kraus-Merkel Malting Co., 97 Wis. 279, 72 N.W.
735 (1897).
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of his mental condition cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. 5
On the other hand a diversity of opinion is found with respect to
mental deficiency less than total and therein lies the core of the problem
that has arisen in the litigation of such cases. .
Here again, there are few pertinent cases of consequence. The initial
decision in the area was Worthington v. Mencer6 which held that,
"[o]ne whose mind is merely dull . . . is [to be] chargeable with the
same degree of care for his personal safety as are others of brighter
intellect. . . ." (emphasis added).J The court's proposition was predi-
cated on the theory that, "... any attempt to frame and adapt varying
.degrees of intelligence would necessarily involve confusion and un-
certainty in the law," s a contention which is reiterated in Wright.
Amplification of this view, which has the purported merits of simplicity
and expediency in application, has also been substantially ascribed to in
Louisiana.9
Weaned from the narrowness of this stand by the continued emer-
gence of scientific advances, the majority of courts, however, now
adhere to the view that variances of mental condition should be taken
into consideration in passing upon an individual's capacity for con-
tributory negligence.10 Despite being clouded by the fact that the
plaintiff was but an "infant" (twelve), the decision in Baltimore &
Potomac R.R. v. Cumberland" postulated the initial break with the
earlier restrictive "Worthington rule." The court in this case decided
that a plaintiff was not to be held for faults which arose from inherent
mental (or physical) defects, but must be held to the exercise of such
facilities and capacities as he was endowed with by nature for avoidance
of danger.' 2
It was not, however, until Seattle Electric Co. v. Hovden"3 that the
same standard was applied to adults. Rather than subscribe to such an
5. The earliest formulation of the rule came out of Boland & Wife v. Missouri R.R.
Co., 36 Mo. 301 (1865) (infants); cf. Lawrence v. Bumberger R.R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 247,
282 P.2d 335 (1955) (insane persons).
6. 96 Ala. 310, 11 So. 72 (1892). The court here equated the ability to recount facts
and give credible testimony as a witness with the capacity of an individual to possess
the requisite mental stability to be contributorily negligent.
7. Id. at 315, 11 So. at 73-4.
8. Id.
9. Johnson v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 16 La. App. 464, 135 So. 114 (1931).
10. Note, Contributory Negligence of Incmnpetents, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 215, 219 (1964).
11. 176 U.S. 232 (1899).
12. Id. at 238.
13. 190 F. 7 (9th Cir. 1911). The court cited Baltimore & Potomac R. R. v. Cum-
berland, supra note 11, as authority for its decision. But see Spragens, The Effect Of
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absolute criterion between total and less-than-total insanity, Seattle
Electric Co. directly adopted the solution of the slowly growing ma-
jority which succinctly answers the dilemma by the relative test of
relinquishing to the jury the determination of what degree of insanity
is required to absolve an individual from contributory negligence in
a particular fact situation. This approach was the one pursued by the
lower court in the instant case.
Enhancing the stature of this view are successive cases, all of recent
vintage, in Kansas, 14 California, 5 and Ohio,16 which have acquiesced
to such mode of determination. There also exists strong dictum to this
effect in an Indiana decision,17 and Georgia lately has expounded a con-
comitant opinion on the degree of "ordinary care" required in such
situations 8 which was untenable with its view earlier in the century. 9
Wright v. Tate21 was no doubt correctly decided in any event,
since there was ample evidence shown that decedent did in fact recog:
nize the danger involved. However, despite the fact that it conforms.
to the position taken by the Restatement, 2' the rationale behind the
court's holding seems dubious at best, and places Virginia in the de7
creasing minority of jurisdictions that continue to adhere to the older.
"absolutist" approach. It is hoped that as more courts adopt the more,
liberal view with regard to less than total insanity, the Virginia Supreme.
Court of Appeals will reassess its position.
Mental Defects, Less Than Insanity, On The Standard Of Care Required Of D'e-
fendants In Civil Negligence Cases, 31 Ky. L.J. 80 (1942), maintaining that the federal
court made a misapplication of the rule pronounced in Baltimore & Potomac R.R. which
the author contends dealt strictly with the standard of care required of infants.
14. Noel v. McCaig, 174 Ken. 677, 258 P.2d 234 (1953).
15. DeMartini v. Alexander Sanatorium, Inc., 192 Cal. App.2d 442, 13 Cal. Rptr. 564
(1961).
16. Feldman v. Howard, 5 Ohio App.2d 65, 214 N.E.2d 235 (1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 10 Ohio St.2d 189, 226 N.E.2d 564 (1967).
17. Riesback Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App. 467, 39 N.E.2d 776 (1942).
18. Plaintiff should be held only to that exercise of ordinary care which " . . every
person in his mental and physical condition would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances." Emory U. v. Lee, 97 Ga. App. 680, 701, 104 S.E.2d 234, 249
(1958).
19. "By 'ordinary care' is meant that degree of care which might reasonably be,
expected of an ordinarily prudent person under like circumstances." Georgia Cotton-
Oil Co. v. Jackson, 112 Ga. 620, 621, 37 SE. 873, 874 (1901).
20. 208 Va. 291, 156 S.E.2d 562 (1967).
21. "Unless the actor is a child or an insane person, the standard of conduct for his
own protection is that of a reasonable man under like circmstances." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 (1965). "Mental deficiency which falls short of insanity,
however, does not excuse conduct which is otherwise contributory negligence." Id.
at Comment g.
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